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Abstract
We consider an economic model of child development with multi-
ple stages. Due to incomplete information, parents are not able
to tailor their investments to their child’s type when the child is
young. We show that incomplete information weakens the im-
portance of early investments in children when inter-stage invest-
ments are easily substitutable, but strengthens them when sub-
stitution is diﬃcult. The latter case is empirically relevant.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The formation of human capital is a central issue in economics. Cunha
and Heckman (2007; henceforth CH) consider an economic model of child
development, where the formation of human capital occurs in multiple
stages via investments. They solve for the optimal intertemporal invest-
ment plan, which has important policy implications.
We extend their framework by assuming that children are diﬀerenti-
ated in the sense that a child’s type determines what type of investment
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is most productive for him/her, and that this information is not available
when a child is young. That is, there is incomplete information when the
child is young. However, we assume that when a child is older its type
is revealed. How does the optimal investment plan change as a result
of incomplete information? Put diﬀerently, how should parents react to
uncertainty about how to treat their young child best?
There are two intuitive guesses: (i) invest less in the early and more
in the late stage, because late-stage investments are more eﬃcient since
they can be tailored to the child’s type which is then known; (ii) invest
more in the early and less in the late stage, because this guarantees that
the eﬀective investment in the early stage is not too bad.
We show that the answer is remarkably simple. It crucially depends
on the substitutability of investment between stages. When investments
are easily substitutable (easier than Cobb-Douglas), intuition (i) is right;
when substitution is diﬃcult (more diﬃcult than Cobb-Douglas), (ii) is
right. More speciﬁcally, incomplete information weakens the importance
of early investments in children when inter-stage investments are easily
substitutable, but strengthens them when substitution is diﬃcult. The
ﬁndings of Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (forthcoming) indicate that
the latter case is empirically relevant; see the discussion in Section 3.
In the next section, we ﬁrst present CH’s model. Then we extend
it by introducing diﬀerentiated investments and incomplete information.
In Section 3, we conclude and discuss the results.
2. MODELS
2.1. CUNHA AND HECKMAN’S MODEL
There is a child with two stages of childhood, t = 1,2. A child’s adult
stock of skill h, also called human capital, is given by
h = m(h
p,θ1,I1,I2),
where hp is the skill of the parents, θ1 the child’s initial ability, and I1
and I2 are investments in the early and the late stage, respectively.1 For
1We use a slightly diﬀerent notation than CH.WEINSCHENK: SKILL FORMATION UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 3












The parameter γ, 0 < γ < 1, is interpreted as a skill multiplier. It inﬂu-
ences the productivity of early investment not only in directly boosting
h, but also in raising the productivity of I2 by increasing the late-stage
ability through high early-stage investments; see CH (p. 38). The pa-
rameter φ, φ ≤ 1, describes how easily investments at diﬀerent stages can
be substituted for each other. For φ = 1, we have a linear relationship:
I = [γI1 + (1 − γ)I2]. That is, investments are perfect substitutes. For
φ → −∞, investments are not substitutable; the function is of the Leon-
tief type. For φ = 0, one gets the Cobb-Douglas function. The elasticity
of substitution is 1/(1 − φ).
We assume that parents at the beginning of t = 1 maximize the
present value of the net wealth of their children




over {I1,I2}.2 The costs of late-stage investments are discounted by the
factor 1/(1 + r), where r is the interest rate. The life-time discounted
wage per unit of skill is denoted by w. So that an optimum exists, we
assume that d2m( )/dI2 < 0. To guarantee that it is optimal to invest
some positive amount, we assume that limI→0 dm( )/dI is “suﬃciently











CH interpret their formula as follows: “High productivity of initial in-
vestment (the skill multiplier γ) drives the parent toward making early
investments. The interest rate drives the parent to invest late”(p. 39).
2Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (2005) also look at this maximization
problem. An alternative approach is to consider a dynamic overlapping generations
model (see the same paper or CH). But, as the authors note, the main conclusions do
not depend on which approach is used.
3For φ = 1 one gets corner solutions and the ratio need not be deﬁned.WEINSCHENK: SKILL FORMATION UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 4
2.2. THE MODEL WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
We now extend the model by considering incomplete information. We
assume that there are two types of investments at every stage: ˆ It and
ˇ It.4 For example, ˆ It may be the investment in child’s athletic abilities
whereas ˇ It may denote investment in child’s creativity. Both ˆ It and ˇ It
are measured in nominal units and are therefore called nominal invest-
ments. How the nominal investments combine to determine the eﬀective
investment5 depends on the child’s type α ∈ {−β,β}:
I
eﬀective
t = (1 + α)ˆ It + (1 − α)ˇ It. (3)
With equal probability the child’s type is β or −β, where 0 < β < 1.
Hence, when the child is of type β, it is most productive to invest in
ˆ It and not in ˇ It; it is the other way round when the type is −β. The
size of the parameter β captures how strongly the productivity of the
intra-stage investments diﬀers.
In t = 1, the child’s type α is not known to the parents. There is
incomplete information. Hence they cannot be sure how best to tailor the
investment to the child.6 Put diﬀerently, parents do not know whether
they should invest in the child’s athletic or creative abilities. In t = 2,
when the child is older, the parents learn the child’s type.
As in CH’s model, we assume that the relationship between the ef-

















The parents’ investment policy maximizes the present value of the net
wealth of their children, that is, the present value of the child’s skill minus
4CH (and several other papers in which these authors are involved) also consider
diﬀerentiated investments. But they do not consider incomplete information.
5Eﬀective investments can be interpreted as productivity-adjusted nominal invest-
ments.
6We do not consider mechanisms that reveal the child’s type. This is justiﬁed
because young children are simply unable to reveal their types (or maybe they cannot
be convinced to participate in any kind of mechanism).WEINSCHENK: SKILL FORMATION UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 5
all nominal investments:








where we have deﬁned the total nominal investment in stage t as IT
t :=
ˆ It + ˇ It.
When parents invest in t = 2, they know the child’s type. Hence, it
is optimal not to invest in the less productive investment: ˆ I2 = 0 when
α = −β and ˇ I2 = 0 when α = β. We denote the highly productive
investments by IH
2 . That is, IH
2 = ˆ I2 when α = β and IH
2 = ˇ I2 when
α = −β.







For φ < 1 it is optimal to invest in both stages.
Proof: See Appendix.
The ﬁrst part of Lemma 1 says that it is optimal to diversify invest-
ments completely by choosing ˆ I1 = ˇ I1.7 The second part states that
although the type of the late-stage investment depends on α, the size of
the late-stage investment, i.e., IH
2 , is independent of α.
As in CH’s model, we would like to determine the optimal ratio of
early-to-late total nominal investments. From the ﬁrst-order conditions
of the problem (see the Appendix) and Lemma 1, one directly gets that












P ro p o s i t i o n 1: Suppose that φ < 1. When φ > 0, the ratio
of early-to-late total nominal investments with incomplete information is
smaller than without incomplete information. When φ < 0, the ratio is
larger with incomplete information.
The intuition is as follows. When investments can be substituted
easily (easier than Cobb-Douglas), a low early-stage eﬀective investment
7Completely diversify means that parents invest the same amount in, e.g., the
child’s athletic and creative abilities.WEINSCHENK: SKILL FORMATION UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 6
can easily be compensated by a high late-stage investment. Late-stage
investments have the advantage that they can be tailored to the child’s
type. Hence, it is optimal to invest little in the early and much in the late
stage. However, when investments are diﬃcult to substitute (more diﬃ-
cult than Cobb-Douglas), this is not the case. A low early-stage eﬀective
investment can only be compensated by a very high late-stage invest-
ment. This would be very costly. Hence, it is optimal to invest much in
the early stage to make sure that the eﬀective early-stage investment is
substantial.8
Should the parents invest more in the early than in the late stage of
childhood? Looking at (2) and (6) yields the following answer.9
P ro p o s i t i o n 2: The early-stage nominal investments exceed the
late-stage investments in the model without incomplete information if
γ > (1 − γ)(1 + r). With incomplete information this is true for γ >
(1−γ)(1+r)(1+β)φ. It is the other way round when the formulas hold
with <.
So when φ > 0, i.e., when substitution is easier than with a Cobb-
Douglas function, the skill multiplier γ must be larger in the model with
incomplete information than in the model without so that the early-
stage investment exceeds the late-stage investment. For φ < 0, i.e., when
substitution is more diﬃcult than with a Cobb-Douglas function, the
multiplier γ can be lower.
To sum up both propositions, incomplete information weakens the
importance of early investments in children when inter-stage investments
are easily substitutable. When substitution is diﬃcult, early investments
8The results we found are mathematically closely related to Acemoglu (2002). He
considers how the augmentation of one factor changes the relative marginal products
of both factors of production. He shows that when the elasticity of substitution is
above 1, then the relative marginal product of the factor which is augmented improves.
When the elasticity of substitution is below 1, then it is the other way round. In our
model, incomplete information augments investments in the late stage relative to
investments in the early stage.
9As in CH’s model, the investment ratio need not be deﬁned for φ = 1. It is easily
shown that the result stated in Proposition 2 is also valid for φ = 1.WEINSCHENK: SKILL FORMATION UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 7
become more important.
For completeness, consider the case with diﬀerentiated investments,
but without incomplete information. Then it is optimal to invest only
in the productive type of investment at both stages. The parameter β
appears in both ﬁrst-order conditions in the same way. Hence, the term
β cancels out in the investment ratio and the ratio is as in CH’s model.
3. CONCLUSIONS AND DICUSSION
We have extended the model of CH by introducing incomplete informa-
tion about a child’s type when it is young. We have shown that incom-
plete information weakens the importance of early investment in children
when inter-stage investments are easily substitutable, but strengthens
their importance when substitution is diﬃcult.
Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (forthcoming) estimate elasticities
of substitution in a model which does not consider incomplete infor-
mation and diﬀers from our setting in other aspects also. Therefore,
their estimates cannot be fully transfered to our model. The authors
show that the substitution in the late stage of childhood is relatively
diﬃcult (more diﬃcult than Cobb-Douglas). This holds for cognitive as
well as noncognitive skills and for several speciﬁcations. Therefore, these
ﬁndings indicate that incomplete information makes early investments
in children more important. Therefore, we strengthen CH’s result that
early investments are of utmost importance.
We have assumed that the diﬀerentiated investments at a stage com-
bine in a linear way to the eﬀective investment, see (3). This simpliﬁ-
cation can be defended as follows: with a more complicated functional
form, it stays true that knowing a child’s type allows tailored investments.
Hence, investing later yields a return on the eﬀective late-stage invest-
ment which is greater, say by a factor (1 + β), than the expected return
early investments have on the eﬀective early-stage investment. Therefore,
the linear speciﬁcation is a reduced form of the more general speciﬁca-
tion. These arguments show that the inter-stage investment problem
does not change due to a more general speciﬁcation. However, the intra-
stage investment problem changes. With a more general speciﬁcation itWEINSCHENK: SKILL FORMATION UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 8
may be optimal to invest in the late stage of childhood in a child’s ability
in which he/she is less talented.
Eliciting the incomplete information through scientiﬁc tests allows a
tailored investment policy also for young children. Then, the same adult
skill levels are attainable with lower investments. Alternatively, with the
same investments, higher skill levels can be achieved. Hence, those tests
are important to improve adult skill and the eﬀectiveness of investments.
The model we consider can be interpreted more broadly. There is a
multi-stage investment problem with only initial uncertainty about the
most productive way to invest. An example may be the problem of global
warming, where it is not yet clear how carbon dioxide (or other climate
gases) can technically most eﬃciently be deterred.
4. APPENDIX: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The following properties of the CES function, as speciﬁed in (1), are
useful:
(i) dI
dIt is positive and homogenous of degree 0.
(ii) d2I
dI1dI2 is positive for φ < 1 and zero for φ = 1.
(iii) d2I
dI2
t is negative for φ < 1 and zero for φ = 1.
(iv) For φ < 1 and Is > 0, limIt→0
dI
dIt = ∞, where s  = t.











α (1 − γ)((1 + β) IH
2
￿ ￿


































(1 − β)ˆ I1 + (1 + β)ˇ I1
￿φ−1
(1 − β)
































(1 − β)ˆ I1 + (1 + β)ˇ I1
￿φ−1
(1 + β)
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[ ]α is the square bracket of (4) evaluated at α. For the ﬁrst-order con-
ditions of ˆ I1 and ˇ I1 we have used the Envelope theorem. Note that we
cannot be sure that in the optimum the ﬁrst-order conditions must be
satisﬁed.
Due to the assumptions on m( ) it cannot be optimal not to invest at
all. Additionally, due to the concavity of m( ) an optimum exists.
Part 1: It holds that ˆ I1 = ˇ I1.
The case φ < 1. Property (iv) of the CES function implies that it is
optimal to invest a positive amount in both stages. Which proves the last
part of Lemma 1 and implies that the ﬁrst-order condition of IH
2 must
be fulﬁlled in the optimum. Since d2I
dI2
t < 0 for φ < 1 and d2m( )/dI2 < 0
the optimal IH
2 is unique. Moreover, since dI
dIt is homogenous of degree 0




1 is decreasing in Ieﬀective
1 .




dˇ I1 . Hence,
dm( )
dI

















(1 − β)ˆ I1 + (1 + β)ˇ I1
￿φ−1
.
From before we know that the ﬁrst-order condition of IH
2 must be fulﬁlled


































1 is decreasing in Ieﬀective
1 , see before, (7) cannot be fulﬁlled.
Also ˆ I1 > ˇ I1 yields a contradiction. Hence, ˆ I1 = ˇ I1.
The case φ = 1. With φ = 1 there are either corner solutions in which
it is optimal to invest in only one stage, or there is an indiﬀerence. In the
latter case, it is weakly optimal to choose ˆ I1 = ˇ I1. In the former case, it
is either optimal (i) not to invest in the early stage, or (ii) it is optimal
not to invest in the late stage. In case (i) ˆ I1 = ˇ I1 = 0. In case (ii) weWEINSCHENK: SKILL FORMATION UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 10









￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
α=β













￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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2 = 0 this requires ˆ I1 = ˇ I1.







The case φ < 1. From Part 1 we know that ˆ I1 = ˇ I1 > 0. This
directly implies (see the ﬁrst-order condition of IH
2 ) that in the optimum,
although the type of the late-stage investment depends on α, the size of
the late-stage investments IH
2 is independent of α.
The case φ = 1. When it is optimal to invest only in the late stage, the
same arguments as with φ < 1 apply. When it is optimal only to invest
in the early stage, we have IH
2 = 0 for both, α = β and α = −β. When
there is a case of indiﬀerence, it is weakly optimal to choose ˆ I1 = ˇ I1,
see Part 1. Then the the ﬁrst-order condition of IH
2 implies that IH
2 is
independent of α. ￿
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